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The Polish parliament returned from its Christmas break on 11 January, but the new parliamentary
term continued to be disrupted by a protest from opposition MPs which began in December. Ben
Stanley writes that although the opposition eventually suspended its occupation of the plenary hall
on the second day of the session, the crisis remains, with government and opposition not only
unable to reach consensus about the legality of vital laws, but also unable to reach consensus
about the legitimacy of the means for reviewing those laws.
Opposition protest in defence of free media in the Polish Sejm, December 2016.
Credits: Platforma Obywatelska RP (CC BY-SA 2.0)
During 2016, Poland metamorphosed from the poster boy of post-communist democratic transition to the rebellious
teenager of the new populist zeitgeist. Having come to power on the back of a cannily moderate campaign, the Law
and Justice government immediately set about pursuing a radical path of reform that has led to accusations of
democratic backsliding and prompted an unprecedented rule-of-law investigation by the European Commission,
although the government has maintained domestic popularity with generous spending and the rolling back of a
planned increase in the retirement age.
In December, a parliamentary crisis erupted after a deputy from the main opposition party Civic Platform was
excluded from the day’s proceedings during plenary debate on the 2017 budget bill, with opposition parties blocking
the rostrum and speaker’s chair of the plenary hall of the Sejm (lower house of the Polish parliament) and staging a
three-week occupation. To understand why an easily resolvable spat has escalated into a stand-oﬀ that threatens
the integrity of the legislature, it is necessary to view these events as the consequence of a broader conﬂict over the
nature and legitimacy of the constitutional order in Poland.
One of the key dividing lines in Polish politics runs between those political elites who fully accept the legitimacy of
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the political system and those who have always contested it. Since the early 1990s, Law and Justice leader
Jarosław Kaczyński has maintained that the liberal-democratic transition was a sham, founded on the self-interested
actions of an alliance of former communists and co-opted former oppositionist liberals. In Mr Kaczyński’s view, the
1997 Constitution was not the founding stone of a democratic Poland but merely the means by which this
illegitimate, inauthentic elite cemented its advantages. The actions of the current government – nominally headed by
Beata Szydło but undoubtedly dominated by Mr Kaczyński – must be understood in the context of their leader’s
drive to build a Fourth Republic on the ruins of the Third.
As I have explained in more detail in a recent article in Democratization, Law and Justice’s previous attempts to
undertake radical reforms to the system between 2005-07 were thwarted not so much by the political opposition but
by the system itself, with the Constitutional Tribunal proving a particularly stubborn bulwark. On regaining power in
late 2015, Law and Justice immediately set about defanging the Tribunal, forcing through appointments of judges
with no judicial mandate and using ordinary legislative acts to stymie its proceedings. By the end of the year, the
Tribunal was not yet subordinate to the executive, but its independence had been severely compromised.
Establishing control over the legislature was the next logical step in the ‘creative destruction’ phase of institutional
reform. This is not to suggest that the government necessarily aimed to provoke the crisis. While the exclusion of the
opposition deputy was procedurally doubtful, the responsibility for disrupting the session of parliament lies squarely
with the opposition. However, the reason that the parliamentary protest escalated into a crisis is because it was
useful for the government that this should happen. It was widely reported that Sejm speaker Marek Kuchciński was
prepared to reach a compromise with the opposition to end the protest and restore the errant deputy, but changed
his mind after a sinew-stiﬀening conversation with Jarosław Kaczyński. Instead, after a hasty meeting of the Law
and Justice parliamentary party, the session of parliament restarted in a hall used for sittings of parliamentary
committees.
Ostensibly, parliament reconvened because of the urgency of passing the budget bill. However, the avoidably
chaotic circumstances in which it did this, with opposition deputies initially unable to enter the hall and then
prevented from making points of order while the speaker swiftly pushed through votes on a show of hands, only
conveyed the impression that Law and Justice was purposely cultivating an atmosphere of institutional dysfunction.
This impression was compounded in the ﬁrst days of the crisis, with the Sejm cordoned oﬀ to prevent protesters
repeating their tactic of blocking its entrances and exits, and all but a few select media outlets barred from entering
the parliament building.
No resolution was found over the Christmas and New Year break, despite informal negotiations between
government and opposition parties. Law and Justice pressed for a solution that would see the opposition accepting
that the budget bill had been passed legally, while the opposition continued to insist that the reconvened session of
parliament was illegal, given the inability of opposition deputies to participate in proceedings, the exclusion of the
media, and the failure of the Sejm administration to show that the votes were quorate and had been counted
properly.
The ﬁrst session of parliament to be held after the outbreak of the crisis in December did not resolve the stand-oﬀ.
Although the opposition eventually suspended its occupation of the plenary hall on the second day of the session,
the Senate had already rendered the issue of the budget bill moot by passing it without amendment. The budget
cannot now be returned to the lower house for consideration, nor can it be vetoed by President Duda, who has no
prerogative to veto budgetary legislation. The only institution that can stop the fruit of the parliamentary crisis
entering into law is the Constitutional Tribunal, but any ruling from the Tribunal would simply compound the problem.
The Tribunal must sit in full session to rule on the constitutionality of budgetary legislation, and since government
and opposition are in dispute over the judicial mandate of three of the sitting judges, it is diﬃcult to see how any
ruling could be passed that both sides would regard as legitimate.
While the parliamentary protest is over, the crisis remains, and it is a crisis that extends beyond the day-to-day
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functioning of the parliament and deeply into the institutional mechanics of the Polish state. In essence, Poland now
has a twin-track legislature to match its twin-track Constitutional Tribunal, with government and opposition not only
unable to reach consensus about the legality of vital laws, but also unable to reach consensus about the legitimacy
of the means for reviewing those laws. It is diﬃcult to see how this system can continue to function. But perhaps that
is the point.
Please read our comments policy before commenting .
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